Freenet Roundup and the Fourth Amendment
The First Circuit held that Eric Johnson, who used Freenet in low-security Opennet mode, did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the request information his node voluntarily sent to a law-enforcement node. On that record, using Freenet Roundup to receive, log, and analyze the request was not a Fourth Amendment search.1
The decision is narrower than a general approval of network surveillance. The court focused on what Johnson's node transmitted, who received it, the warnings attached to his chosen mode, and what the government tool did not reach. It expressly left Darknet mode undecided.2
Freenet was not a conventional website or cloud service. It was free software designed to let people share files with greater anonymity. A file was split into encrypted blocks and distributed among users' computers. To retrieve it, a user's computer requested those blocks from other Freenet computers, which could pass the requests along. Each participating computer was a node; the computers it contacted directly were its peers.1
Opennet
The software connected the user to strangers automatically. In low-security mode, directly connected peers could see the user's IP address, and the program warned that activity and identity might be traceable. Johnson used this mode.2
Darknet
The user connected only to peers the user selected. It was the more private mode. Johnson did not use it, and the First Circuit said its ruling did not decide whether the same analysis would apply.2
June 8, 2021
Freenet Roundup identified three requests associated with an IP address later tied to Johnson. The tool retained requests with at least 16 of the possible 18 hops remaining, checked block hashes against a library of known CSAM, and applied a formula intended to distinguish an original requestor from a relay.3
2022
After subpoenaing Verizon for subscriber information, the FBI obtained a warrant for Johnson's Billerica residence. Agents found devices containing CSAM. The warrant came after Roundup's network observations; the later suppression dispute targeted the warrantless use of Roundup that led investigators to Johnson.4
Johnson moved to suppress. He compared Roundup to the technology in Kyllo v. United States and the location-data collection in Carpenter v. United States. His expert emphasized the research and validation resources needed to build the law-enforcement tool. The government answered that Johnson had voluntarily sent requests to strangers in Opennet mode.6
May 2, 2024
Johnson entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved the suppression issue. The district court sentenced him to 120 months in prison and five years of supervised release. The Justice Department's sentencing release also reports $38,000 in restitution and forfeiture.7
2026
In United States v. Baxter, the First Circuit upheld a warrant affidavit built partly on Freenet request data. The affidavit described the network, the information gathered, the mathematical method, and the agent's conclusion that the user was an original requestor. It did not have to explain in greater detail why the requests were inconsistent with relaying another user's traffic.8
2026
In United States v. Daigle, another published Freenet case, the First Circuit upheld a warrant based on three requests for three known files within ten minutes, despite a nine-month delay before the warrant. Daigle addressed probable cause and staleness. It did not resolve Johnson's separate claim that obtaining the request information was itself a search.9
2026
The First Circuit affirmed. It assumed without deciding that Johnson subjectively expected privacy, then held that the expectation was not one society would recognize as reasonable. The government node operated like an ordinary Opennet peer when it received Johnson's voluntary request; Roundup added Hops-to-Live filtering and logging, followed by analysis outside the network.10
What the decision reaches
Request information Johnson's node voluntarily transmitted to a stranger's node while he operated in low-security Opennet mode after warnings that his identity and activity could be traced.
What it does not reach
The court expressly left Darknet mode open. The opinion does not decide tools that obtain information an ordinary peer could not receive, or whether every Roundup-based affidavit establishes probable cause.
Where it controls
Johnson binds federal courts in the First Circuit. Elsewhere it is persuasive authority; state constitutions and statutes may provide additional protection.
The software name today
The network in this case is the original Freenet, now maintained as Hyphanet. The project currently using the Freenet name describes itself as a ground-up, non-backwards-compatible redesign.11
Record limitation
This report relies on the First Circuit's detailed account of the district decision and evidentiary hearing. The Massachusetts suppression filings, hearing transcript, expert report, and warrant affidavit were not independently reviewed.
Keep three questions separate
Johnson asks whether the Roundup observation was a search. Baxter asks whether the affidavit explained the lead well enough. Daigle asks whether the requests showed intentional conduct and whether the information was stale.
Preserve the explanation
Keep the tool and software versions, network mode and warnings, raw request data, ordinary-peer information, added logging, hash source, formula and threshold, validation material, analyst steps, and a witness who can explain the original-requestor inference.
Primary and technical sources reviewed for this report. Pinpoints use the linked PDF page numbers.
United States v. Johnson, No. 24-1467, published opinion at PDF pp. 1–2, 16–29 (1st Cir. July 7, 2026), 2026 WL 1959441. The court affirmed the denial of suppression after holding Johnson lacked an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the Opennet activity at issue.
Johnson, PDF pp. 18–25, 27–29, especially p. 27 n.14. The court limited the challenged conduct to receipt, logging, and analysis of information accompanying voluntary requests, distinguished broader surveillance, and expressly left Darknet mode undecided.
Johnson, PDF pp. 3–8 and p. 19 n.13. Freenet mechanics; Opennet; Hops to Live; hash comparison; requestor/relayer formula; request data; and Dr. Levine's distinction between ordinary operation and unique logging.
Johnson, PDF pp. 7–9. Three requests between May 29 and June 8, 2021; Verizon subpoena; February 2022 warrant; and devices found during the search.
Levine, Liberatore, Lynn & Wright, “Statistical Detection of Downloaders in Freenet”, PDF pp. 1–8, especially p. 7 (IEEE International Workshop on Privacy Engineering, May 2017); Johnson, PDF p. 7 n.6, p. 19 n.13, and pp. 23–24; First Circuit oral argument, 1:37 and 5:01. The opinion identifies Levine as Roundup's creator and quotes his suppression-hearing testimony; defense counsel described him as the government's expert. The paper's worst-case adjustment estimated a 323/14,021, or 2.3%, false-positive rate on the real-data test described there.
Johnson, PDF pp. 9–13; United States v. Pobre, No. 8:19-cr-348-PX, 2022 WL 1136891, PDF pp. 8–14 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 2022). The First Circuit recounts Johnson's motion, the government's response, and the district ruling; Pobre supplies the earlier Roundup analysis on which the lower court relied.
Johnson, PDF pp. 12–13; District of Massachusetts sentencing release, May 2, 2024. The opinion confirms the conditional plea and prison/supervision terms; the Justice Department supplies the plea and sentencing dates and $38,000 restitution/forfeiture figure.
United States v. Baxter, No. 25-1056, PDF pp. 2–6, 10–14 (1st Cir. June 8, 2026). The court held that the affidavit sufficiently described the information gathered, mathematical method, and original-requestor conclusion; greater detail distinguishing relaying was not required.
United States v. Daigle, No. 24-1889, PDF pp. 2–7, 12–24 (1st Cir. June 10, 2026). The court upheld the warrant on intentionality and staleness grounds and did not decide the privacy question presented in Johnson.
Johnson, PDF pp. 16–29. The published opinion assumes subjective privacy, rejects objective privacy, distinguishes Carpenter and Kyllo, and affirms.
Hyphanet, project home; Freenet FAQ. The current project sources explain the 2023 naming split and that the current Freenet is a ground-up redesign that is not backwards compatible with the original network now maintained as Hyphanet.
Underlying district record. United States v. Johnson, No. 1:22-cr-10066-DJC-1 (D. Mass.). The First Circuit says its facts come from the district decision and evidentiary hearing. This report relies on that appellate account and does not claim independent review of the suppression motion, opposition, transcript, expert report, or warrant affidavit.